Distinguished contributors take up eminent scholar Daniel R. Schwarz’s reading of modern fiction and poetry as mediating between human desire and human action. The essayists follow Schwarz’s advice, “always the text, always historicize,” thus making this book relevant to current debates about the relationships between literature, ethics, aesthetics, and historical contexts.

This book excavates the political thought embedded in Heidegger’s philosophy. Though keenly aware of the controversy over Heidegger’s National Socialism, Ward highlights the political ramifications of Heidegger’s thought as opposed to entering the polarized debate concerning the “Heidegger Case.” Chapter 1 accesses Heidegger’s political thought via the distinction Heidegger made between science and philosophy. This leads to Heidegger’s view that modern “culture,” is basically “... superficial and merely contemporary. ‘Liberalism’ will be its political embodiment”. Chapter 2 pursues these themes with (...) special emphasis on Heidegger’s opposition to any naturalistic or biological interpretation of human beings, and this in contrast with the racism of National Socialism. The third chapter describes how, for Heidegger, the rank of a people can be determined in terms of how that people comes to terms with the question of Being. Those who have not fallen away from this question still stand at the highest rank, while those who have are spiralling into decline. As in chapter 2, Nietzsche looms large in this chapter, and one gets the distinct impression here that Heidegger has taken up the Nietzschean project of restoring an order of rank sans physiologie. In chapter 4, Ward articulates “the decisive difference between Heidegger’s National Socialism and that of the National Socialists themselves”. This difference is explored through Heidegger’s interpretation of work—both physical and intellectual—as a means to understanding Heidegger’s critique of Marxism, the role of the university, and, therewith, the primarily philosophical foundation of the sciences within the spiritual mission of the German people. (shrink)

The concept of corporate reengineering provides a rich opportunity to consider certain political implications of using the stakeholder concept. By showing the ethical incoherence of corporate reengineering, as the concept is advocated by Michael Hammer and James Champy, I make the point that the stakeholder concept can be interpreted as a means for advocating just human communities. A new conception of Business & Society as Community Studies is one consequence of this argument.

How do we frame decisions to use-or not use-military force? Who should do the killing? Do we need new paradigms to guide the use of force? And what does "victory" mean in contemporary conflict? In many ways, these are timeless questions. But they should be asked again in light of changing circumstances in the twenty-first century. The post-Cold War, post-9/11 world is one of contested and fragmented sovereignty. Contested because the norm of territorial integrity has shed some of its absolute (...) nature. Fragmented because some states do not control all of their territory and cannot defeat violent groups operating within their borders. Humanitarian intervention, preventive war, and just war are all framing mechanisms aimed at convincing domestic and international audiences to go to war (or not), as well as to decide who is justified in legally and ethically killing. The international group of scholars assembled for this book critically examine these frameworks to ask if they are flawed, and if so, how they can be improved. Finally, the volume contemplates what all the killing and dying is for if victory may prove, ultimately, to be elusive. (shrink)

This paper shows that expected utility belongs to the intersection of models satisfying betweenness and a homotheticity condition for risky choice. Betweenness models can accommodate variable risk attitudes, originally highlighted by the Allais paradox, by restricting indifference curves to be linear while allowing non-parallelism. Homotheticity, in contrast, restricts indifference curves to be parallel while permitting non-linearities, such as those highlighted by inverse-S probability weighting. Data from an experiment indicate that approximately 2/3s of participants satisfied homotheticity. Of this group, about half (...) satisfied the expected utility hypothesis. The other half violated expected utility and therefore betweenness. These results indicate that homothetic preferences, and in particular those violating betweenness, can be empirically relevant for decision making under risk. (shrink)

This dissertation explores issues in the philosophy of psychology and metaphysics through the lens of the emotion of disgust, and its corresponding property, disgustingness. The first chapter organizes an extremely large body of data about disgust, imposes two constraints any theory must meet, and offers a cognitive model of the mechanisms underlying the emotion. The second chapter explores the evolution of disgust, and argues for the Entanglement thesis: this uniquely human emotion was formed when two formerly distinct mechanisms, one dedicated (...) to monitoring food intake and protecting against poisons, the other dedicated to protecting against parasitic infection, where driven together until they became functionally integrated. The third chapter explores the sorts of acquisition mechanisms that could give rise to the patterns of individual and cultural level variation we find with disgust elicitors. It argues for the Empathic Acquisition thesis, which holds that one important route for the social acquisition and transmission of disgust elicitors is linked to empathic recognition of facial expressions of the emotion. The fourth chapter builds on the Entanglement thesis, and embeds the emotion of disgust in gene-culture coevolutionary theory and the tribal instincts hypothesis. The Co-opt thesis is defended, which maintains that disgust was co-opted to play an important role in our moral psychology, particularly in our cognition of social norms and ethnic boundary markers. In doing so, however, it brings to bear many features initially linked to poisons and parasites. This explains the puzzling and troublesome character of moral judgments linked to disgust. After shifting gears from psychology to metaphysics, the fifth chapter recasts the Humean tradition of projectivism in the terminology of cognitive science. Using examples such as disgust, I argue that a psychologized projectivism is able to make sense of the idea that some properties are projected onto the world, rather than found there to begin with. The final chapter criticizes three other accounts of the property of disgustingness, two inspired by functionalism in the philosophy of color, one inspired by fittingness accounts in metaethics. I argue that none provide nearly as satisfactory account of the property as the psychologized projectivism articulated previously. (shrink)

This dissertation is an investigation into the ground of moral objectivity. My preliminary claim is that in order to be objective, moral properties must be real properties. The following question is, what kind of properties are moral properties? A number of recent philosophers have argued that moral properties are natural properties. ''Natural" in this context means " open to investigation and discovery by the senses or by empirical science." The natural properties proposed in the recent literature are connected to the (...) property of human well-being. The main project of my dissertation is to show that natural properties are not adequate as the foundation for moral objectivity, because there is no necessary connection between any natural properties and moral properties. Another answer to the question of what kind of properties moral properties are is that they are supernatural properties. "Supernatural" in this context means "not open to investigation and discovery by the senses, or by empirical science." It is my argument that a singular supernatural being who created the world and has particular ideas about what sorts of people/actions/states of affairs are good and bad or right and wrong is the only sufficient ground for moral objectivity. Given such a being, moral properties will be real and objective. They will also be moral properties, since the originator of these properties confers value on them. Using and expanding on work in Divine Command Theory, especially that of Robert M. Adams, my original contribution to this discussion is to propose that moral properties are relational properties. The relationship is between persons, actions, states of affairs, etc., in the physical world, and the ideas, desires, character, or commands of the supernatural being. An important limitation of my dissertation project is that I do not consider any practical issues such as "How do we know whether God exists?", "How would God communicate the content of morality to us?", or "What is God like?" These are important and worthwhile questions, but are not a part of my present investigation. (shrink)

In _The Smile of Tragedy_, Daniel Ahern examines Nietzsche’s attitude toward what he called “the tragic age of the Greeks,” showing it to be the foundation not only for his attack upon the birth of philosophy during the Socratic era but also for his overall critique of Western culture. Through an interpretation of “Dionysian pessimism,” Ahern clarifies the ways in which Nietzsche sees ethics and aesthetics as inseparable and how their theoretical separation is at the root of Western nihilism. (...) Ahern explains why Nietzsche, in creating this precursor to a new aesthetics, rejects Aristotle’s medicinal interpretation of tragic art and concentrates on Apollinian cruelty as a form of intoxication without which there can be no art. Ahern shows that Nietzsche saw the human body as the vessel through which virtue and art are possible, as the path to an interpretation of “selflessness,” as the means to determining an order of rank among human beings, and as the site where ethics and aesthetics coincide. (shrink)

The folklore of Groundhog Day is an invitation to reflect on continuity, choice, and reinvention in our daily lives. Groundhog Day is an annual opportunity to imagine how the future could unfold as a straightforward extension of what we are doing today in one another’s company, or as a departure from the typical course of our joined endeavors. The joined endeavor at issue in this paper is the act of justifying inclusion of the study of managerial practice, commonly called Management, (...) in the undergraduate college curriculum in the United States. Management is routinely shielded from a process of intellectual justification. There is a fruitful alternative to this de facto exemption. I argue that there is a place in the undergraduate curriculum for systematic attention to managerial practice, but that place need not be filled with a Management major per se. This new curricular place is anchored in the experience of living our everyday lives in a world managed by others. The inspiration for imagining this different place came one Groundhog Day, as I was sorting mail delivered to me by the US Postal Service. (shrink)

Public philosophy distinguishes itself from other philosophical undertakings by either addressing public problems, i.e. those with broad social consequence, or doing the work of philosophy in a public setting beyond the confines of a purely academic environment. The ironic and darkly absurd character of the defining features of civilization and progress – realities Indigenous Peoples have confronted with devastating consequences for centuries – is the way in which both generate tremendous unhappiness and destruction. The living historical character of our cultures (...) is captured in the power plus place equals personality axiom that Deloria formulated. The modus operandi of Indigenous solutions not only addresses the “know‐how” but the moral “should we” dimensions of proposed solutions. Most of humankind talks about resources because the worldview guiding the powerful economic and political interests thinks in those terms about our relatives. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

The fundamental postulate of sociobiology is that individuals exploit favorable environments to increase their genetic representation in the next generation. The data on fertility differentials among contemporary humans are not cotvietent with this postulate. Given the importance ofHomo sapiensas an animal species in the natural world today, these data constitute particularly challenging and interesting problem for both human sociobiology and sociobiology as a whole.The first part of this paper reviews the evidence showing an inverse relationship between reproductive fitness and “endowment” (...) (i.e. wealth, success, and measured aptitudes) in contemporary, urbanized societies. It is shown that a positive relationship is observed only for those cohorts who bore their children during a unique period of rising fertility, 1935–1960, and that these cohorts are most often cited by sociobiologists as supporting the central postulate of sociobiology. Cohorts preceding and following these show the characteristic inverse relationship between endowment and fertility. The second section reviews the existing so-ciobiological models of this inverse relationship, namely, those of Barkow, Burley, and Irons, as well as more informal responses among sociobiologists to the persistent violation of sociobiology's central postulate, such as those of Alexander and Dawkins. The third section asks whether the goals of sociobiology, given the violation of its fundamental postulate by contemporary human societies, might not be better thought of as applied rather than descriptive, with respect to these societies. A proper answer to this question begins with the measurement of the pace and direction of natural selection within modern human populations, as compared to other sources of change. The vast preponderance of the shifts in human trait distributions, including the IQ distribution, appears to be due to environmental rather than genetic change. However, there remains the question of just how elastic these distributions are in the absence of reinforcing genetic change. (shrink)

This article develops an evidence-based public theology of Laudato si’ that US Catholics might use to help society address anthropogenic climate change. The essay argues that religion generally and Laudato si’ specifically have the potential to inspire action in the United States to address human-forced climate change. At the same time, the article identifies the heretofore lack of social scientific data to discern which theological insights from the encyclical should be incorporated into a public theology of Laudato si’ that addresses (...) this climate change. To redress this lacuna, the article presents original social scientific data from research about Laudato si’-informed climate change messages conducted on adults in the United States. Informed by this data, the essay concludes with discussion of how US Catholics might proceed to construct an evidence-based public theology of Laudato si’ in response to anthropogenic climate change. (shrink)